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If a man takes no thought about what is distant, 
he will find sorrow near at hand. 
/Confucius/ 
V.I. Gurevich 
 
STABILITY OF MICROPROCESSOR RELAY PROTECTION 
AND AUTOMATION SYSTEMS AGAINST INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTIVE 
ELECTROMAGNETIC IMPACTS. PART 1 
 
ȼɫɬɚɬɶɟɪɚɫɫɦɚɬɪɢɜɚɸɬɫɹɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵɜɨɡɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɹɦɨɳɧɵɯɷɥɟɤɬɪɨɦɚɝɧɢɬɧɵɯɢɦɩɭɥɶɫɨɜ, ɝɟɧɟɪɢɪɭɟɦɵɯɩɪɢɹɞɟɪ-
ɧɨɦɜɡɪɵɜɟɢɥɢ ɫɩɨɦɨɳɶɸɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɶɧɨɝɨɨɛɨɪɭɞɨɜɚɧɢɹ, ɩɪɟɞɧɚɡɧɚɱɟɧɧɵɯɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɶɧɨɞɥɹɩɨɜɪɟɠɞɟɧɢɹ ɷɥɟɤɬɪɨɧɧɨɣ 
ɚɩɩɚɪɚɬɭɪɵ, ɜɱɚɫɬɧɨɫɬɢɦɢɤɪɨɩɪɨɰɟɫɫɨɪɧɵɯɭɫɬɪɨɣɫɬɜɪɟɥɟɣɧɨɣɡɚɳɢɬɵɢɚɜɬɨɦɚɬɢɤɢ, ɚɬɚɤɠɟɦɟɪɵɡɚɳɢɬɵ 
ɨɬɷɬɢɯɜɨɡɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɣ. 
 
Problems of impact of the electromagnetic high-power pulses generated at nuclear explosion or by means of the special equip-
ment, intended specially for damage of the electronic equipment, in particular digital protective relays and automatic systems, and 
also ways of protection from these impacts are considered  
 
1. CHALLENGES OF MODERN POWER INDUSTRY: 
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY 
 
For  decades,  the  problems  of  EMC  have  been  the  
prerogative of specialists in electronics, radio engineering 
and communications. Suddenly, over the last 10-15 years, 
this problem has become critical for the power industry. 
Of course, high electromagnetic fields have always ex-
isted at electric power facilities; however, electrome-
chanical devices, which have been applied for decades in 
automatics, control and relay protection, were not ex-
posed to electromagnetic fields too much and so no sig-
nificant EMC problems were encountered. But in the last 
two decades there has been a sharp change-over from 
electromechanical relay protection devices to microproc-
essor-based (MPD) ones and automation. Moreover, the 
change-over has included both the construction of new 
substations and power plants and replacing old electrome-
chanical protection relays (EMPR) at the old substations, 
built in those days when nobody assumed using micro-
processor technologies, with the up-to-date MPDs. The 
latter have proved to be very sensitive to electromagnetic 
interference coming "out of thin air", penetrating through 
operating power circuits, voltage circuits and current 
transformers. Some malfunctions of MPD were caused by 
mobile phones [1] and similar types of equipment. There 
have been other cases, such as malfunctions of micro-
processor-based devices at the operating capacities of the 
Mosenergo, Ochakovskaya and Zubovskaya substations. 
The operating algorithm of protection was affected by 
lightning, excavators working nearby, electric welding 
and other types of interference. The Lipetsk substation 
startup was postponed for six months due to faults of mi-
croprocessor-based devices while they spent nearly $1.5 
million for the MPDs. As a result, the substation was 
commissioned using a set of conventional defenses [2]. In 
practice, a shortcut on the 110 kV side can cause protec-
tion failures on the 330 kV side, and interference during 
switching of the same voltage rating penetrated inputs 
(through the auxiliary circuits) of the relay protection 
apparatus operating under the other voltage rating [3]. 
According to Mosenergo, faults due to improper operation 
of relay protection amount to 10 % out of total number of 
malfunctions, and basically refer only to microelectronic-
based and microprocessor-based relays [4]. Enabling 
SIEMENS MP protection at CHP-12 of Mosenergo, 
OAO, designed by Atomenergoproekt Research Institute, 
is the most obvious example of such problems, as EMC 
requirements were not considered in the design at all. Due 
to interferences there were more than 400 fault data sig-
nals detected at discrete and analogue inputs of MPD 
.during the August-December of 1999 alone [4]. Also, it 
should be kept in mind that the cost of each MPD fault is 
10 times higher than the cost of an electromechanical re-
lay fault because of the high number of functions concen-
trated in each MPD. Such a high percentage of malfunc-
tions due to insufficient EMC results from the fact that the 
MPD interference sensitivity is much higher than that of 
traditional electromechanical protection. For example, 
according to [4] when an electromechanical relay opera-
tion can be affected by the energy of 10-3 joule, the energy 
of only 10-7 joule causes the malfunction of the micro-
chips. The difference is about 4 orders of magnitude, or 
10000 times.  
The level of damage depends on the insensitivity of 
each circuit component and the energy of the powerful in-
terference as a whole, which can be absorbed into the cir-
cuit without the appearance of any defect or failure. For 
example, although the switching noise caused by the induc-
tive load with an amplitude of 500V is a twofold voltage 
surge, it is unlikely to lead to the failure of an electromag-
netic relay with a 230V AC coil due to its insensitivity to 
this kind of interference and its short duration (it lasts only 
several microseconds). The situation is different if the chip 
is powered from a 5VDC source. The impulse interference 
with an amplitude of 500V is hundredfold higher than the 
supply voltage of the electronic component and leads to the 
inevitable failure and the subsequent destruction of the de-
vice. Surge resistance of the chips is several orders of mag-
nitude lower than that of the electromagnetic relays [5]. 
Long-term statistics confirms that the number of such dam-
ages doubles every three to four years [5]. This statistic is 
in good agreement with the so-called Moore’s law [6] who 
in 1965 showed that the number of semiconductor compo-
nents in microchips doubles roughly every two years and 
this trend has remained valid for many years. If some ten 
years ago, the so-called transistor-transistor logic (TTL) 
chip contained 10-20 elements per square millimeter, and 
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had a typical supply voltage of 5V, now the popular chip 
can contain nearly a hundred of CMOS (Complementary 
Metal-Oxide Semiconductor) transistors on every square 
millimeter of the surface and has supply voltage of only 1.2 
V. The up-to-date solid state technologies, for example, 
SOS (Silicon-On-Sapphire), raise the number up to 500 
elements per square millimeter of the surface [7]. It is ob-
vious that such chips would require even lower supply 
voltage and it is even more obvious that such improved 
microelectronics integrity reduces insensitivity of its com-
ponents to high voltage surge due to the reduced distance 
between electroconductive elements, lower thickness of 
insulating layers and reduced operating voltage of semi-
conductor elements.  
Recent trends of technological evolution and ever-
growing electromagnetic vulnerability of national infra-
structures (power and water supply, communications, etc) 
have come under military consideration long since. Mili-
tary research centers of almost all developed nations have 
carried out intensive research and development on special 
weapons capable of destroying electronic equipment. 
Mass media have published dozens of articles discussing 
methods for increasing efficiency of electromagnetic ac-
tions aimed at destroying electronic equipment [8-12].  
High-altitude nuclear explosions have an extremely 
high destructive effect. An explosion at an altitude of 
200-300 km wouldn’t have any influence on humans and 
would escape detection while the resultant electromagnetic 
pulse (rather a range of pulses with different characteris-
tics) would cause a catastrophe for electronics and com-
puters of the whole country (see Table 1). The electric 
power industry can suffer heavily due to long mileage of 
overhead electric lines acting as giant antennas absorbing 
electromagnetic pulse energy over a large territory and de-
livering it directly to the power stations and substations 
apparatus. Considering the special hazard of such an explo-
sion to the power energy industry, the International Electro-
technical Commission (IEC) developed a series of specific 
standards detailing methods for testing electric power lines 
and other power equipment in order to evaluate their resis-
tance to high-altitude nuclear explosions [13-31].  
If the recent tendency (i.e., "Smart Grid" concept) 
will be widely implemented in power industry, even a 
single high-altitude nuclear explosion will immediately 
kill all national power industry, as shown in [32], which 
makes it especially attractive to warring parties. 
 
2. CLASSIFICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 
INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTIVE 
ELECTROMAGNETIC IMPACTS 
English-language publications call the intentional 
destructive electromagnetic impacts as "High Power Elec-
tromagnetic Threats (HPEM)" divided into two types: 
"High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)" and "In-
tentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI)". 
HEMP is a very powerful electromagnetic pulse re-
sulting from a high-altitude nuclear explosion. It has long 
been known that powerful electromagnetic pulse follow-
ing a nuclear explosion is one of the damage effects of 
such explosion. Theoretical studies on X-ray radiation 
effects conducted by Arthur Compton, an American sci-
entist specializing in theoretical physics, in 1922 (in 1927 
he was awarded with Nobel Prize for this finding) showed 
that a nuclear explosion is always followed by electro-
magnetic emission. At that time this effect was neglected 
and it was noticed only after the first nuclear weapon test 
explosions. In [33] it is described as follows: At the end 
of June 1946 a series of nuclear detonation tests was con-
ducted under the codename of Operation Crossroads at 
Bikini Atoll (Marshall Islands). The purpose was to ex-
plore damage effects of nuclear weapons. Test explosions 
revealed a new physical phenomenon – generation of 
powerful electromagnetic pulses (EMP) which immedi-
ately became of high interest. The highest EMP followed 
high-altitude explosions. In the summer of 1958 a series 
of high-altitude nuclear explosions was conducted. The 
first series of explosions, under the codename of Opera-
tion Hardtack, was conducted above the Pacific Ocean 
near Johnston Island. The series consisted with two mega-
ton-range detonations: Tack – at an altitude of 77 km and 
Orange - at an altitude of 43 km. In 1962 high-altitude 
explosions were continued: a 1,4 megaton warhead was 
detonated at a 450 km altitude under the codename of 
Starfish Prime. The USSR also conducted a series of test 
explosions in 1961-1962 aimed to evaluate the impact of 
high-altitude explosions (180-300 km) to antiballistic 
missile defense apparatuses. The tests revealed powerful 
EPM with high damage effects to widely separated elec-
tronics, communications and power lines as well as to 
radio stations and radars. 
The relationship of the electronics effective damage 
area and altitude of a 10 megaton explosion is shown in 
the following table.  
Table 1 
Effective damage area in dependence 
with nuclear explosion altitude 
Altitude of 
explosion, km 
Approximate diameter of damage 
area, km 
40 
50 
100 
200 
300 
400 
1424 
1592 
2.242 
3.152 
3.836 
4.402 
 
According to IEC there are three components of 
HEMP: E1, E2 and E3. 
E1 –  is  the  "fastest"  and  "shortest"  component  of  
HEMP resulting from a powerful stream of high-energy 
Compton electrons (product of the interaction of Ȗ-
quantum of the initial radiation of the nuclear explosion 
with atoms of the atmosphere) drifting in the geomagnetic 
field with a velocity close to the speed of light. This inter-
action between very fast-moving electrons and magnetic 
field generates a pulse of electromagnetic energy focused 
by geomagnetic field and oriented to the Earth from the 
high-altitude. The pulse typically rises to its peak value in 
about 5 nanoseconds and the magnitude of this pulse typi-
cally decays to half of its peak value within 200 nanosec-
onds. By the IEC definition, this E1 pulse is fully ended at 
one microsecond (1000 nanoseconds). 
 E1 results from the most intensive electromagnetic 
field causing very high voltages in electric circuit and cre-
ates impulse voltages up to 50 kV/m with a power density 
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of 6.6 MW per square meter at middle latitudes near to 
ground-level. E1 causes the most damage to the electronics 
due to the power surge and electrical breakdown of p-n-
transitions of semiconductors and isolation. Conventional 
arresters ensuring protection against atmospheric power 
surges sometimes are not fast enough to respond in a timely 
fashion and protect equipment from E1, while the power 
they dissipate can be inadequate for absorbing energy of 
the ȿ1 pulse component which results in destruction of 
such arresters. 
E2 – is the intermediate (steepness and time length) 
component of EMP which according to IEC definition can 
last from 100 microseconds to 1 millisecond. The E2 
component of the pulse has much resemblance to the elec-
tromagnetic pulses produced by nearby lightning. Field 
gradient can reach 100 kV/m. Because of the similarities 
to lightning-caused pulses and the widespread use of 
lightning protection technology, the E2 pulse is generally 
considered to be the easiest to protect against. However, 
the combined impact of ȿ1 and ȿ2 components makes 
other problem, as while ȿ1 destroys protection elements 
ȿ2 penetrates the equipment unchecked. 
The E3 component is very different from the other 
two major  components  of  nuclear  EMP.  It  is  a  very  slow 
pulse, lasting tens to hundreds of seconds, that is caused by 
the nuclear detonation heaving the Earth's magnetic field 
out of the way, followed by the restoration of the magnetic 
field to its natural place. The E3 component is similar to a 
geomagnetic storm caused by a very severe solar flare. 
Gradient of induced field can reach 1V/km. Like a geo-
magnetic storm, E3 can produce significant geomagnetic 
induced currents in long electrical conductors, including 
long power lines, which can then penetrate power line 
transformers with following saturation, impedance falling-
off and increasing of currents until the coils blow-out. 
Since the 80’s of past century, a number of countries 
have started intensive development of so called "Super 
EMP" – nuclear charge with amplified electromagnetic 
emission. The studies have mainly focused on two direc-
tions: wrapping the charge in a casing of a substance that 
emits high-energy Ȗ–radiation under a neutron exposure to 
a nuclear explosion as well as focusing Ȗ –radiation.  Ac-
cording to experts Super EMP will allow creating a field 
with a gradient of hundreds and thousands of kilovolts per 
meter near the Earth’s surface. Moreover, the military 
makes no secret that the main targets for such EMP weapon 
in future battles will be the government and military ad-
ministrations as well as national infrastructures, including 
power, water supply systems and communications.  
However, the nuclear explosion is not the only 
source of powerful EMP. Today, the non-nuclear source 
of EMP can be transported with conventional and high-
precision means of delivery. 
Thus,  the  problems of  defense  against  EMP impact  
will be the concern of experts despite the results of nu-
clear disarmament negotiations. 
IEMI – is the second type of non-nuclear deliberate 
destructive EM impact. First theories on creation of non-
nuclear shockwave emitters of superpower EMP (SWE) 
were formulated in the early 50’s of past century by nu-
clear physicist Andrei Sakharov during his work on the 
nuclear weapon. 
 
Fig. 1. 1 – electromagnetic cavity; 2 – cut; 3 – coil with  
non-firing current; 4 – vectored electromagnetic emission;  
5 – explosive substance; 6 – switchboard; 7 – energy accumulator 
(condenser); 8 – standing wave; 9- flying explosion products 
 
Getting primary neutrons initiating the fission proc-
ess in a nuclear weapon required a superpower source of 
current pulse. Sakharov’s generator represented a ring of 
explosive substance surrounding the copper coil. The set 
simultaneously exploded detonators initiating an axipetal 
detonation. At the moment of demolition, there was a 
discharge of power condenser with the current generating 
magnetic field inside the coil. Enormous pressure of the 
shock-wave (approximately one million atmospheres) 
squashed and bridged the windings of the coil which was 
transformed into a tube enclosing the field inside the coil. 
The current loop collapsed under a speed of several kilo-
meters per second depending on the type of explosion. As 
we know from physics, the magnetic field intensity cre-
ated by the current in this case is in proportion to the 
speed of inductance change over time. Since the size of 
the coil changed with considerable speed during the loop 
collapse, the amplitude of the magnetic field also became 
huge (tens of millions amperes). At that moment, fusing 
destroyed one of the resonator cavity ends and converged 
to the point and deflected a shock-wave back changing 
the field with the jump. Thus, the standing wave became a 
high-pulse power traveling wave generating a pulse 
stream of RF electromagnetic emissions. In fractions of 
nanoseconds the field changed more suddenly than under 
the sine law with a period equal to squeezing-dispersing 
time, which means that the function describing the change 
included many frequencies. Therefore, the shock-wave 
source was an ultra-wideband and emitted the pulses at 
the range of hundreds of MHz to hundreds of GHz lasting 
for tens-hundreds of microseconds. 
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Fig. 2. Powerful vircators developed at Tomsk Polytechnic  
Institute, 1 – insulator; 2 – metal cathode; 3 – drid anode;  
4 – virtual cathode; 5 – dielectric gap 
 
According to American experts, the shock-wave 
emitters were first demonstrated by Clarence Fowler at 
Los  Alamos  National  Laboratory  at  the  end  of  the  50’s  
[34]. In the 60’s experts and politicians from USA and 
USSR realized that such sources of superpower EMP can 
be the basis of the new kind of weapon. This was declared 
by N.S. Khrushchev who in the 60’s hinted at some fan-
tastic weapon. Surely, it took some time to create the real 
weapon based on theoretic evidences. The possibility of 
using SWE as an independent weapon capable of generat-
ing superpower EMP was first announced by 
Prischepenko A.B., Doctor of Science and Head of Labo-
ratory of Special Weapons of Central Research Institute 
for Chemistry and Mechanics after successful tests were 
conducted on March 2, 1984 at Krasnoarrneyskiy Re-
search Institute Geodeziya (now FFE RE "Geodeziya") 
training range. Later Prischepenko A.B., Associate Mem-
ber of Academy of Military Science and Doctor of Sci-
ence formulated the general concept for the tactical em-
ployment of electromagnetic weapons.  
Today,  intensive  research  of  IEMI  is  being  con-
ducted in numerous directions and non-explosive shock-
wave emitter (SWE) is not the only type of non-nuclear 
electromagnetic weapon known.  
There is a wide range of high-power microwave de-
vices: relativistic klystron tubes and magnetrons, reflex-
triodes, backward-wave tubes, gyrotrons, Virtual Cathode 
Oscillator (Vircator), etc. Construction of a vircator capable 
of generating high-power single energy pulses is simple 
and compact allowing using it in a relatively wide range of 
microwave frequencies. The concept of the vircator lies in 
accelerating a powerful electron stream with a anode grid. 
This powerful stream of electrons initially bursts from 
cathodes (metal cylinder rods with a diameter of a couple 
of centimeters, see Fig. 2) under the high-voltage pulse 
(hundreds of kilovolt) and demonstrates electron emission 
explosive behavior. A significant number of electrons 
comes through the anode grid forming the charge cloud 
behind the anode. Under certain circumstances this area of 
charge cloud oscillates in the anode region. Generated with 
the frequency of the electronic cloud oscillation, the mi-
crowave field is radiated into the environment through di-
electric gap. Pre-oscillation generated current in vircators 
can reach 1-10 kA. Vircators are the most suitable devices 
for generating nanosecond-range pulses at long-
wavelengths within the centimeter range. During the ex-
periments, capacities of 170 kW - 40 GW in the centimeter 
and decimeter range were obtained on such devices. Ac-
cording to published data the experimental device with a 
pulse power of approximately 1 GW (265 kW, 3.5 kA) can 
damage electronics within 800-1000 m. 
 
Fig. 3. Relativistic high-power microwave generators based on 
gyrotrons, vircators and backward-wave tubes developed by 
different Research Institutes in Russia 
 
Even such well-known devices as high-voltage pulse 
Marx  generators,  see  Fig.  4,  containing  the  set  of  high-
voltage condensers and tube surge arresters (80 equal 
sided) can be used as powerful sources of microwave ra-
diation. In such devices all condensers are initially 
charged in-parallel from the high-voltage power supply 
and at the moment of cell-type tubes synchronous break-
down all condensers become connected in-series. In the 
FEBETRON-2020 portable generator, see Fig. 4, current 
pulses of 6 kA are generated under a voltage of 2.3 Ɇȼ, 
resulting in radiation of powerful EMPs.  
 
Fig. 4. American unit FEBETRON-2020 constructed on Marx 
generator principle and its simplified scheme 
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Another IEMI trend is the so called beam weapon. 
This weapon is based on the usage of a spot beam of 
charged or neutral particles generated with different types 
of  accelerators  both  on  the  ground  and  from  satellites  in  
space. Development of the beam weapon has been greatly 
intensified soon after the declaration of Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) by Ronald Reagan, the President of USA, 
in 1983. Los Alamos National Laboratory and Livermore 
National Laboratory have become the central research sites. 
Some scientists declared that the laboratories were success-
ful in generating streams of high-energy electrons with 
capacities of a hundred times greater than that generated in 
research accelerators. At the same laboratory experiments 
under the Antigone program proved that an ionized channel 
pre-generated by laser beam in atmosphere allows electron 
beam to propagate nearly ideal without diffusion. 
Powerful compact emitters which can be assembled 
on a truck or minibus pose a particular risk. 
In 1977 a compact generator of high-power (100-
1000 MW) plane-polarized mono-directional wave beams 
of ultra-wideband electromagnetic radiation with pulse of 
nanosecond and subnanosecond range designed for damag-
ing electronics was developed in Tomsc Institute of High 
Current Electronics (IHCE), Siberian Branch, Russian 
Academy of Sciences for researching generation of super-
power electric pulses (of giga- and teraWatts range) under 
the supervision of Gennady Mesyats academician, vice-
president of Russian Academy of Sciences see Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5. Compact powerful ultra-wideband sources of radiation 
with capacity up to 1 GW developed at Tomsc Institute of High 
Current Electronics 
 
Today, such sources are available from the IHCEfor 
just $40-60k and can be installed in a minibus or small truck. 
All contact information for such kind of orders is available at 
the official web-site of the IHCE. Similar movable and port-
able sources are also developed in USA, see Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Compact source of powerful monodirectional  
ultra-shortwave radiation (95 GHz) developed by Sandia  
National Laboratories, USA, under Raytheon technology (top), and 
powerful sources of mono-directional radiation assembled on  
chassis of Hummer off-roadster and ACP Stryker. More powerful 
complex is planned to be installed on board of AC-130 airplane 
Some countries (USA, Israel, etc.) are developing 
compact electromagnetic guns with relatively low capac-
ity capable of damaging electronics within 100 m. Such 
devices are interesting both for military and police. A 
present-day car, crammed with electronics, has the same 
demolition objective as any other modern system. An 
American company, Eureka Aerospace, has developed 
and launched the production of electromagnetic "stopper" 
of a moving car (EMP car-stopper). 
This weapon damages the microprocessor, igniting 
system, fuel injection system and other vehicle electron-
ics. What will happen if such weapons fall into the hands 
of the terrorists (surely, sooner or later this will happen)? 
Besides, it is not that hard to find such weapons as many 
popular technical magazines describe numerous self-made 
systems of such kind, see Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7. Directional microwave self-made generators described in 
popular technical magazines 
 
All this reminds one of the prophetic aphorism of 
Winston  Churchill  who  many  years  ago  said,  that  "The 
latest refinements of science are linked with the cruelties 
of the Stone Age". 
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Gurevich V.I. 
Stability of microprocessor relay protection and automation 
systems against intentional destructive electromagnetic  
impacts. Part 1. 
Problems of impact of electromagnetic high-power pulses gen-
erated at nuclear explosion or by means of special equipment 
intended specially for damage of electronic equipment, in par-
ticular, digital protective relays and automatic systems, along 
with ways of protection against these impacts are considered.  
Key words – electronic equipment, relay protection,  
electromagnetic impacts. 
 
